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Abstract:  
 
The paper analyzes the current state of the world economy and offers a short-
term forecast of its development. Our analysis of log-periodic oscillations in 
the DJIA dynamics suggests that in the second half of 2017 the United States 
and other more developed countries could experience a new recession, due to 
the third phase of the global financial crisis. The economies of developing 
countries will continue their slowdown due to lower prices of raw commodities 
and the increased pressure of dollar debt load. The bottom of the slowdown in 
global economic growth is likely to be achieved in 2017-2018. Then we expect 
the start of a new acceleration of global economic growth at the upswing phase 
of the 6th Kondratieff cycle (2018-2050). A speedy and steady withdrawal 
from the third phase of the global financial crisis requires cooperative action 
between developed and developing countries within G20 to stimulate global 
demand, world trade and a fair solution of the debt problem of developing 
countries.  
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Introduction 
Starting from 2008, as a result of a change in Kondratieff wave1 phases and shift in 
techno-economic paradigm (related to silicon semiconductor electronics), the world 
economy has been going through another cyclic crisis [Glaz’yev, 1993, 2010]. As 
forecasted [Akaev, Pantin, Ayvazov, 2009], the post-crisis depression having spread 
across the developed nations has been quite noticeable and would most likely last 
until 2017-2018. We expect an upturn in global growth to start in 2018 (see Fig. 1) 
on an upswing phase of the Sixth Kondratieff wave (2018-2040). We suppose that 
the innovative technologies of the sixth techno-economic paradigm will play a 
crucial role in ending the current financial and economic crisis and supporting 
further economic growth. NBIC technologies being the key technologies of the sixth 
wave of innovation [Glaz’yev, 2010; Kazantsev et al., 2012; Koval’chuk, 2011; 
Rudskoy, 2007; Pride, Korotayev, 2008] will become a sustainable source for 
economic growth and increasing competitiveness of the developed countries. 
According to another point of view, the key technologies would be MANBRIC-
technologies which include medical, additive, information and cognitive 
technologies along with nanotech, biotechnologies and robotics (see e.g. [Grinin, 
Korotayev, 2015a]). 
We witness to the implementation of Gerard Mensch’s principle – 
‘innovations overcome the depression’ – which was formulated during the global 
economic crisis of the 1970-s [Mensch, 1979]. Locomotives of the expansion phase 
of the sixth K-wave will be the USA, the European Union, Japan and Korea, the 
acknowledged leaders in terms of NBIC-technologies. At the same time, noteworthy 
is the fact that over the last years the center of global innovative activity has shifted 
to East Asia, where the number of patents granted annually is higher than in the rest 
of the world as a whole (see Fig. 1):  
 
                                                          
1 For more detail on Kondratieff waves see e.g. [Kondratyev, 1925, 2002; Akaev, 2010, 2011, 
2013; Korotayev, Grinin, 2012; Korotayev, Tsirel, 2010; Korotayev, Zinkina, Bogevolnov, 2011; 
Korotayev, Grinin, 2012; Grinin, Korotayev, Tausch, 2016].  
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Fig. 1. Number of patents granted annually in various world macro regions 
(Source: [WIPO, 2016]) 
 
In 2014 Korea granted more patents for various inventions than entire Europe2, 
whereas Japan granted twice as many patents as Korea. However, Japan and Korea 
are not the only ones that contribute to the leading positions of East Asia. China also 
contributes to those, having issued the same number of patents as Japan in 2014, 
which was two times more than that in Europe (see Fig. 2):  
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Fig. 2. Number of patents granted annually in various countries, including 
European Patent Office (Source [WIPO, 2016]) 
 
Recession and depression of the fifth K-wave 
According to Akaev [2013], the fifth K-wave started in 19823. Indeed, in 1982 global 
economic revival took place, which evolved into the longest (within the fifth K-
wave) 12-year period (1982-1994) of sustainable and rapid growth at 3-4% annually. 
During that period investment was mainly made in fixed capital. World economy 
was truly prosperous between 1996 and 2006; productivity growth rates were twice 
higher than those of the period between 1985 and 1995. Starting from 2006-2007 
growth rates declined among the OECD countries (see Fig. 4), which marked a 
transition from the upswing phase to the downswing phase of the fifth K-wave. Thus, 
2006 became a climax of the fifth long cycle. Expansion phase of the latter lasted 
for 24 years. In just three years, the world faced the global financial crisis, which 
resembled that of 1929, which preceded the Great Depression of the 1930s, which 
justifies the name given to the recent crisis, the Great Recession. The crisis coincided 
with the depression phase of the Juglar cycle. According to experts, the upswing of 
the sixth K-wave is likely to start between 2018 and 2020. 
                                                          
3 See [Grinin, Korotayev, 2012].  
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The beginning of the recession of the fifth K-wave, dated 2006, is confirmed 
by the dynamics of technical progress and investment. Thus, the USA total factor 
productivity, TFP, which is also called technological progress, began impeding in 
2013 [IMF, April 2015, p. 103]. One should take into account, that the USA is 
considered to be world technological leader. In 2013 the impact of information and 
communications technology (ICT), which cannot be overestimated, started 
decreasing [Perminov, 2007]. By the mid 2000s an accelerated growth of TFP in 
ICT came to an end. Both production and capital influx to this sector reduced over 
the years preceding the financial crisis of 2007-2008 [IMF, April 2015, p. 107]. 
Hence, ICT being the technological basis of the fifth K-wave exhausted its 
possibilities to rise TFP, which marks the end of the upswing phase of the fifth long 
cycle and the beginning of search for new technological basis. 
However, according to Akaev and Rudskoy [2013], ICT will help implement 
new key technologies of the sixth K-wave, being a drawbridge between the fifth and 
the sixth long cycles. It is crucial to support further development of ICT, as it will 
finally have a positive influence on TFP increase in the long run. Investments in 
fixed capital reduced after 2006, which marked a search for a new technological 
basis (see Fig. 3).  
They decreased by 25% and have not reached initial level hitherto. However, 
after the boom of the 2000s in developing countries investment growth was not 
intermitted even at the times of crises (see Fig. 2), which is natural; K-waves come 
about earlier in developed countries as opposed to developing ones. A slight 
reduction in investment in developing countries after 2012 only partly reflects weak 
economic activity, having been a result of the financial crisis of 2008-2009. It is 
mostly a result of reducing prices for stock commodities, deterioration of financial 
environment, decreasing foreign direct investment (FDI), caused by the second wave 
of the world crisis after the fall of stock markets on August 4, 2011.  
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Fig. 3. Dynamics of the gross fixed capital formation (as % of GDP) in 
developed and developing countries between 1990 and 2014 (Source [World 
Bank, 2016]) 
 
 
Beginning of the second phase of the global financial crisis  
 
The date of the second wave of the global financial crisis, August 3, 2011, was 
forecasted by the authors in 2010, nine months before the outbreak of the crisis itself 
[Akaev, Sadovnichy, Korotayev, 2010]. In a series of works by the group of authors 
[Akaev, Sadovnichy, Korotayev, 2010; Akaev, Fomin, Tsirel, Korotayev, 2010; 
Akaev, Sadovnichy, Korotayev, 2011; Akaev, Fomin, Korotayev, 2011; Akaev, 
Sadovnichy, Korotayev, 2012] the forerunners of cyclic financial and economic 
crises were singled out; they included skyrocketing prices for oil and gold connected 
with creation and implosion of financial bubbles [Akaev, Sadovnichy, Korotayev, 
2010]. It was further shown, that explosive price growth is well described by 
accelerating log periodic oscillations, coinciding with explosive growing trend, 
which is represented by a power-law function with quasi-singularity at a certain 
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moment of time [Akaev, Sadovnichy, Korotayev, 2011]. Hence, one has to estimate 
the coordinates of the singularity point.  
Causes and effects of the second wave of the 2011 financial crisis were 
investigated in our work [Akaev, Korotayev, Fomin, 2012]. It was shown that ultra-
soft monetary policy of the USA and to a lower extent of other world powers resulted 
in an explosive growth of the world commodity prices. At times of crisis such policy 
was pursued to save financial and banking spheres. During the post-crisis period this 
policy stimulated economies. However, the cheap money flowed into stock and 
commodity exchanges and created “financial commodity bubbles”. Their implosion 
in 2011 was associated with instability and economic downturn.  
Despite quick and sustainable recovery after the global financial crisis of 
2008-2009, developing countries demonstrated an impeded growth after 2011. 
 
Fig. 4. GDP growth dynamics of developed and developing countries between 
2004 and 2015 (Source: [IMF, 2016]) 
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In 2013 the average economic growth rates of developing countries were 1.5% lower 
than between 2010-2011, when the post-crisis recovery in the corresponding 
countries reached its climax. Moreover, this slowdown was almost simultaneous and 
affected almost every developing nation. Having started in the second half of 2011, 
the slowdown spread across 4/5 of the developing countries by the mid 2012. The 
first phase of the crisis resulted in falling standards of living in both developed and 
developing countries, which in its turn caused social upheaval in a number of 
developed nations; in various developing nations of the Middle East and North 
Africa social unrest turned so violent, that it practically became one of the causes of 
what later became known as “the Arab Spring” (see e.g. [Korotayev, Zinkina, 2011; 
Korotayev et al., 2012; Grinin, Issaev, Korotayev, 2015]). 
On the verge of the second wave of the global crisis the world experienced a 
skyrocketing growth of prices for gold and other precious metals, food, energy 
carriers and other commodities. We have already mentioned the implosion of the 
“gold bubble” in August 2011. We identified, that implosions in various markets of 
stock goods came about simultaneously with bankruptcies and economic slowdown 
in developing countries, which are heavily dependent on trade in stock commodities. 
Apparently, such synchronous implosions and bankruptcies result in failures of 
established economic and trade chains. Thus, in 2011 that led to slump in world trade 
growth rates. For the first time within the last 30 years they stopped to exceed 
substantially world economic growth rates (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Dynamics of trade growth and economic growth in various countries and groups 
of countries between 2010 and 2015. IMF forecast up to 2020 
(%) 
 
Years/% 
Actual growth IMF forecast  
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Growth rate of 
the world 
economy 
5,4 4,2 3,4 3,3 3,4 3,1 3,6 3,8 3,9 4,0 4,0 
Growth rate of 
the world trade 
12,5 6,7 2,9 3,3 3,3 3,2 4,1 4,6 4,6 4,7 4,6 
Growth rate of 
developed 
economies 
3,1 1,7 1,2 1,1 1,8 2,0 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,0 1,9 
Growth rate of 
developing 
economies 
7,5 6,3 5,2 5,0 4,6 4,0 4,5 4,9 5,1 5,2 5,3 
Growth rate of 
the US 
economy 
2,5 1,6 2,2 1,5 2,4 2,6 2,8 2,8 2,7 2,2 2,0 
Growth rate of 
German 
economy 
3,9 3,7 0,6 0,4 1,6 1,5 1,6 1,5 1,3 1,3 1,3 
Growth rate of 
the UK 
economy 
1,9 1,6 0,7 1,7 3,0 2,5 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,1 
Growth rate of 
Japanese 
economy 
4,7 -0,5 1,7 1,6 -0,1 0,6 1,0 0,4 0,7 0,9 0,7 
Growth rate of 
Chinese 
economy 
10,6 9,5 7,7 7,7 7,3 6,8 6,3 6,0 6,1 6,3 6,3 
Growth rate of 
Indian 
economy 
10,3 6,6 5,1 6,9 7,3 7,3 7,5 7,5 7,6 7,7 7,7 
Source: World Economic Outlook URL: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/index.aspx  
(Access date: 11.27.16). 
 
Indeed, over the last years, world trade growth rates have been significantly 
lower than economic growth rates, which has not been observed over the last 20 
years. One of the main reasons for decreasing world trade growth rates were the 
consequences of the global crisis of 2008-2009. The crisis caused the drop in the 
world turnover. Between 1980 and 1993 during the upswing phase of the fifth K-
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wave world trade grew rapidly at 4.7% annual growth rate as opposed to 3% annual 
world GDP growth rate. The elasticity coefficient equaled to 1.6. Between 1994 and 
2007 the global trade grew twice faster than the world production, which is validated 
by IMF data [IMF, April 2015, p. 44]. Between 1986 and 2000 world real GDP 
growth by 1% correlated with 2.2% world trade increase. That elasticity was 
significantly higher than that of the previous period between 1970 and 1985 and the 
following period of 2001-2013. The elasticity coefficient of those two periods 
accounted for 1.3. Current fall in turnover is the major threat for developing 
economies. Therefore, all the measures contributing to global trade growth will also 
contribute to overcoming the economic crisis. 
 
On the third phase of the global crisis and its causes 
 
As mentioned earlier, the developed economies including the USA will experience 
the third crisis phase, determined by mid-term economic downturn related to the 
Juglar cycle. The developing countries are also at risk of encountering the third phase 
of the crisis due to debt issues, which we mentioned in 2012 [Akaev, Pantin, 2012]. 
In October 2015 the Goldman Sachs think tank with the chief analyst of world stock 
markets Peter Oppenheimer as its head, analyzed economic slowdown in China and 
other developing nations and came to a conclusion, that the third wave of the 
economic crisis was on the way. They claim that the third crisis wave is a result of 
the first two waves, the US and the EU bank failures and the EU sovereign debt 
crisis. According to their position, the following scenario took place. In response to 
the first two debt crises the Central Banks, including the FRS, the ECB and others 
sharply decreased the discount rates. Investors profited from that and began funding 
developing countries, especially China. Most of the Chinese debts were cumulated 
after the crisis of 2008-2009, when Chinese authorities expanded lending to keep a 
rapidly growing economy buoyant against the background of the global financial 
crisis.  
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 As a result, developing nations cumulated a huge dollar debt, which 
continues growing and becomes a concern on the world scale. Dollar debt in the 
form of dollar credits and obligations issued by the companies of developing nations 
has more than doubled over the last 5 years and totaled 3.3 trillion dollars by the 
beginning of 2016. At present the US dollar is regaining its strength, while investors 
dump their assets within developing nations. Thus, companies from developing 
countries experience difficulties servicing debts and finding funding for large 
projects of theirs. The problem of covering dollar debt by companies from 
developing countries escalated in 2014. Modest dollar strengthening caused fall of 
national currencies, which aggravated debt servicing. The companies started cutting 
their costs and laying employees off, which resulted in impeded GDP growth in 
developing countries. Hence, economic slowdown affected both developing nations 
and the world economy as a whole. 
 Total debt of governments, households, corporations and financial sector in 
developing nations increased by 1.6 trillion dollars in 2015 and reached 62 trillion 
dollars, exceeding their total GDP by 210%. Developed nations, on the contrary, cut 
total debt by 12 trillion dollars to 175 trillion US dollars. Such massive debt severely 
limits opportunities for borrowing to maintain further economic growth. According 
to IMF, by 2015 companies from developed countries cut their debt only by .4% to 
87.4% of GDP, while companies from developing nations increased their debt by 
6.7% up to 101.3% of GDP. Total corporate debt of the first 19 developing nations 
exceeded 25 trillion US dollars. Corporate debt of the least developed nations tripled 
after the crisis of 2008-2009 and accounted for 2.6 trillion US dollars. AS IMF points 
out, in 2016 and in the next three years all the borrowers will be obliged to repay 
their obligations debts and other credits. Between April and December of 2016 they 
had to pay 730 billion dollars, while the sum of 2017 debt totals over 900 billion. 
 Global economic and trade slowdown along with huge debts implies a new 
global crisis, the third after the Great Recession of 2009. Carmen Reinhart and 
Kenneth S. Rogoff claim, that after reaching a certain point the government debt 
impedes economic growth. According to their estimates, critical level of government 
12 
 
debt is 90% of GDP. In this case, a substantial amount of budget expenditures is 
used to repay debts instead of investing in infrastructure and development. As we 
have pointed out earlier, vast majority of developing nations is already in danger 
zone, while the developed nations are approaching it. It is apparent, that debts are 
easier to repay, when the income grows. However, when debt reaches a critical point, 
economy, on the contrary, experiences lack of income. Hence, at present, we are at 
risk of mass defaults, which in their turn can pave the way for a new crisis. 
 Thus, heavy dependence of the world economy on credits is justly called 
“unhealthy” in the UNCTAD’s 2015 report on trade and development. The report 
says, that if the world does not solve the “debt” problem, it will face a new sovereign 
debt crises, like the one Greece recently came through. According to UNCTAD data, 
the level of global debt rose 1.4 times from 142 trillion dollars in 2007 to 199 trillion 
dollars at the end of 2015, exceeding the world GDP accounting for 77.3 trillion 
dollars by 2.6 times. In the nearest future the world will experience the US dollar 
regaining its strength, low commodity prices and slow economic growth in both 
developed and developing countries. Under such conditions, the majority of 
companies will run into difficulties attracting funding to repay bank debts, which is 
likely cause corporate defaults in 2017. The latter would lead to further economic 
slowdown and financial instability.  
 All in all, current economic growth is not reaching its potential, which is 
caused by ongoing attempts to lower debt burden in the USA, the EU and the over-
credited developing nations. Both developed and developing nations face falling 
demand, which influences world turnover. Economic slowdown is accompanied by 
falling household incomes, which might lead to social unrest. Most likely the world 
is now reaching the third phase of the world crisis after the first phase centered on 
the USA and the UK (2008-2009) and the second phase centered on the Eurozone 
and developing markets (2011-2012). The third phase will be mostly caused by huge 
debts of both developing and developed nations, excessive and ineffective 
investment and excessive production capacities, especially in China. 
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Protracted strengthening of US dollar and low commodity prices  
 
One of the most powerful arguments is the strengthening of the US dollar that started 
in 2014. Moreover, after a period of cheap dollar (2000-2013) usually comes a 
period of strong dollar, which lasts for 8-10 years. Rising dollar and increasing US 
discount rate create a number of problems for developing countries. First, capital 
flows from developing nations to American market. Second, developing countries 
face difficulties serving rising dollar debt and borrowing to stimulate growth; 
discount rate growth will explode loan costs all over the world. Third, when dollar 
regains strength for a long period of time, commodities usually fall in price. Once 
investors are confident about strengthening of dollar, non-productive assets fall in 
price. Oil, gold and other commodities prove to be indicators of weak or strong 
dollar. 
 The US dollar is experiencing a long cycle of rising, which will last at least 
up to 2025. That causes a long cycle of low or moderate prices for commodities, 
which are the main assets of the majority of developing nations. Hence, low 
commodity prices will impede potential economic growth of developing countries 
in the mid-term. Real prices for quite a few commodities, especially metals, have 
decreased in comparison with its peak values of 2011. For example, prices for metals 
fell in price by more than 20% in 2015 and are expected to fall by approximately 
10% in 2016. Food prices declined by 16% in 2015 and are expected to fall by 5% 
in 2016. While fall in oil prices is mainly connected with its overproduction, 
declining prices for metals are mostly correlated with a new economic development 
model of China [Grinin, Tsirel, Korotayev, 2015]. Indeed, Chinese share in 
consumption of metals has accounted for more than 50% of the world consumption 
over the last years. Hence, economic slowdown in China plays a crucial role in 
decreasing prices for metals. And this trend will remain for a long time. 
 So, the expansion phase (1998-2001) of commodity supercycle came to an 
end. Almost the entire commodity complex, especially metals, is imbalanced. The 
widely tracked S&PGSCI slumped by 13.6% in July 2015 and reached the minimum 
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of 2002. Previous bottom was tracked in 1998 with preceding 30% slump. At the 
end of 2015 IMF revised its forecast of world economic growth in 2016 due to falling 
commodity prices and made it more pessimistic [IMF, October 2015]. IMF also 
pointed out, that the period of low commodity prices would be protracted, and the 
entire world would have to adapt to that. According to IMF, commodity exporters 
were going to face the worst prospects. In accordance with IMF estimates, 
commodity exporters would suffer from decreasing economic growth rates, which 
would account for 1% annually. Exporters of energy carriers were going to 
experience an annual economic slowdown of 2.25% [IMF, October 2015]. Thus, the 
slowdown is not only cyclical, but also structural. Therefore, IMF suggests that 
economic policy should be aimed at raising investment in innovations, in other 
words, raising productivity rates. 
 Kondratieff’s theory describes cyclical changes of high and low prices for 
commodities [Akaev, Sadovnichy, Korotayev, 2010; Grinin, Korotayev, 2014]. 
Marchetti and Nakicenovic drew attention to periodic fluctuations of prices for main 
energy carriers, which coincide with the K-waves [Marchetti, Nakicenovic, 1979]. 
Such fluctuations usually last for 10-12 years and mark a structural change in energy 
consumption. We showed [Akaev, Sadovnichy, Korotayev, 2010], that these 
fluctuations signify world cyclic economic and financial crises. Indeed, when world 
economy experiences the upswing phase of a long cycle, world market conditions 
improve, while oil prices, in accordance with Kondratieff wave dynamics, remain at 
a low stable level, defined by the cost of production and transportation. Once market 
conditions dramatically worsen, downswing begins and capital flows into oil and 
gold, booming the prices for these goods (see Figs. 5 and 6). 
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Fig. 5. Dynamics of average annual oil prices between 1970 and 2015 
 (solid line – nominal price; dotted line – oil prices in inflation adjusted 2015 
dollars)  
Sources: database of Earth Policy Institute (Washington, DC, 2016). URL: www.earth-
policy.org/datacenter/xls/update67_5.xls (oil prices between 1970 and 2006); database of U.S. 
Energy Information Administration. URL: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_a.htm (oil prices between 2007 and 2015); 
World Development Indicators Online (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016), URL: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (data on the US inflation). 
 
                                                          
 For the period between 1970 and 1973 the figure displays prices for light crude oil of Saudi 
Arabia. Between 1974 and 1985 it depicts purchase prices of American oil refineries for imported 
crude oil. Between 1986 and 2015 it describes average annual prices for Brent oil. 
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Picture 6. Dynamics of average annual gold prices between 1970 and 2015,  
in US dollars 
(solid line – nominal price; dotted line – gold price in inflation adjusted 2015 
dollars) 
Sources: database of the World Gold Council. URL: http://www.research.gold.org/prices/ (gold 
prices between 1970 and 2009); database of the USA Gold Reference Library. URL: 
http://www.usagold.com/reference/prices/history.html; World Development Indicators Online 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016), URL: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators (data on the US inflation).  
 
It is clear from Fig. 5, that after the oil crisis of the early 1970s, oil prices rose to 
$50 per barrel, later skyrocketed up to $95 per barrel in 1979, marking the beginning 
of the economic crisis of 1980-1982. Later, oil prices decreased gradually till the 
mid 1980-s, plunged between 1985 and 1986, then stabilized between $20 and $40 
per barrel till 2003 and later began growing again. As we have mentioned earlier, 
between 2006 and 2007 the world economy faced the start of a downswing phase of 
the fifth K-wave, which is likely to last till 2017-2018. Deteriorating world market 
conditions accelerated oil and gold prices growth (see Fig. 10-11). From 2006 to 
July 11, 2008 oil prices grew rapidly from $60 to $147 per barrel (see Fig. 10). That 
was followed by the global economic crisis, which is usually assumed to have begun 
                                                          
 Average annual prices at the London Exchange. 
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on September 15, 2008. Price for one barrel of Brent oil plunged to $40, then reached 
$70-80 per barrel, keeping this value through 2009, and later increased up to $100-
120, stabilizing within this corridor between 2011 and 2013. Finally, in the second 
half of 2014 after the end of the program of quantitative easing and in anticipation 
of rising discount rate by FRS, oil started falling in price and reached $50 per barrel 
by the beginning of 2015. Average annual Brent oil price accounted for 
approximately $52 in 2015. However, in January 2016 oil prices slumped to $30 oil 
per barrel, reaching pre-2004 levels. Then the prices totaled $45 per barrel between 
March and May of 2016, which has been followed by a certain recovery to over $50 
in direct connection with the activities of both OPEC and non-OPEC oil exporting 
countries.  
 Nevertheless, oil market supply exceeds demand, which is why the majority 
of forecasts for 2016 predicted the prices of $45-55 per barrel, which mostly has 
turned out to be correct. Hence, 12 years have passed since significant increase of 
oil prices. Moreover, that period almost entirely coincided with the recession phase 
of the fifth K-wave (2006-2018). It is logical to expect moderate oil prices and prices 
for energy carriers and other commodities including gold, other precious metals, 
food etc. at the beginning of the expansion phase of the sixth K-wave (2018-2040). 
Under favorable conditions, this period can last up to the 2030s. Moreover, oil prices 
are most likely to stabilize between $40 and $80 per barrel and to reach the 
mentioned ceiling by the end of the period. Annual inflation of the US dollar is 
supposed to account for 2%. It is also taken into account, that oil price corridor 
during the expansion phase of the fifth K-wave (1982-2006) was between $20 and 
$40 per barrel (see Fig. 10).  
Decreasing prices for commodities caused falling national currencies and 
economic slowdown in developing countries. “Commodity currencies” are heavily 
dependent on raw material prices, so devaluation of national currencies in 
developing countries is a natural reaction to decreasing world prices for their main 
export goods, which allows avoiding significant production fall and unemployment 
growth. That is the way developing nations follow to adapt to new economic 
18 
 
conditions. However, significant decrease of national currencies exchange rates 
entails a risk of negative outcome for enterprises’ budgets, which hampers dollar 
debt repayment. 
The only thing left is to define the beginning of the third phase of the financial 
crises. In order to do so, we should investigate a short-term prospect of the US 
economic growth. 
The US economy has demonstrated relative stability over the last years. At 
the beginning of 2016 IMF forecasted the US annual economic growth of 2.6% in 
2016 and 2017, which would surpass 2015 2.5% [IMF, January 2016, p.7]. Three 
factors contributed to such a positive forecast, which were rising demand, based on 
strong consumer expectations, rising employment rates and growth of the real estate 
market. In January 2016 unemployment level declined to 4.9%, reaching the 
minimum over the last decade. However, this was accompanied by rising concerns 
about potential interruptions in the US economic growth, when the FRS first after 
the crisis of 2008-2009 raised the discount rate on December 12, 2015. Experts even 
predicted recession. They supposed that the US economy might not stand global 
economic downturn, if the latter continues in 2017. Further downturn of, say, 
Chinese economy can lead to economic slowdown of American key partners, which 
are Canada and Mexico. 
At the same time, there are several inner risks that include instability of the 
stock markets in the first place. Indeed, American stock market is on the verge of 
crisis. At the beginning of 2016 American stock indices showed the largest fall over 
the last 85 years. If the FRS raises the discount rate in 2017, stock markets are most 
likely to fall. In this case, low oil prices will lead to significant decrease of 
investment in energy sector, while strengthening dollar will limit American export. 
Moreover, annual inflation rate has remained much lower than an optimum level of 
2%. According to the FRS forecast, in 2016 basic inflation will account for 1-1.5% 
and reach the target of 2% only in 2017. 
Taking into account all the aforementioned risks, in March 2016 the FRS 
changed its forecast of the USA economic growth rate, decreasing the latter to 2.1-
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2.3% instead former 2.3-2.5% predicted in December 2015. Recently, OECD also 
changed its economic forecast of the US growth rates, lowering them from 2.5% to 
2%. As is known, the lower the trajectory of US economic growth, the more 
vulnerable it is to external shocks. We also suppose that US stock markets will 
experience a fall in 2017. Due to further slowdown the US economy will face an 
economic downturn in accordance with mid-term Juglar cycles (7-11 years). 
We will try to calculate the potential date of this crisis on the basis of Dow 
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Starting from the spring of 2009, simultaneously 
with the policy of quantitative easing, a new stock market bubble was created (see 
Pic. 7). 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. DJIA dynamics between fall of 2006 and fall of 2016 
Source: database of Yahoo Finance. URL: 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EDJI/history?p=%5EDJI. 
 
On the other hand, in a number of seminal works by Didier Sornette, Anders 
Johansen and their colleagues (Sornette, Sammis 1995; Sornette, Johansen 1997, 
2001; Johansen, Sornette 1999, 2001; Johansen et al. 1996; Sornette 2004; etc.) it 
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has been demonstrated that what is known as “stock exchange bubbles” can be quite 
well described mathematically. They have shown that accelerating log-periodic 
oscillations superimposed over an explosive growth trend that is described with a 
power-law function with a singularity (or quasi-singularity) in a finite moment of 
time 
C
t , are observed in situations leading to crashes and catastrophes. They can be 
analyzed because their precursors allow the forecasting of such events. One can 
mention such examples as the log-periodic oscillations of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA) that preceded the crash of 1929 (e.g., Sornette, Johansen 1997), or 
the changes in the ion concentrations in the underground waters that preceded the 
catastrophic Kobe earthquake in Japan on the 17th of January, 1995 (e.g., Johansen 
et al. 1996), which are also described mathematically rather well with log-periodic 
fluctuations superimposed over a power-law growth trend. 
The basic equation derived by Sornette and tested on many historical examples of 
bubbles has the following form:  
 
ln[p(t)] = A – m (tc – t)α { 1 + C cos[ωln(tc – t) + φ] },                                             (1) 
or   
p(t) = A – m (tc – t)α { 1 + C cos[ωln(tc – t) + φ] },                                                   (1a) 
 
where p(t) is the value of a certain financial indicator at the moment t; tc is the 
“critical time”; А, m, C, α, ω, and φ are constants which are to be defined on the 
basis of data on gold prices from the start of the bubble formation till the forecast 
moment.  
In these equations m (tc – t)α describes the main trend of the growth dynamics; 
with the approaching of the critical point tc, price p(t) approaches the maximum 
value A. Against this background periodic oscillations with reduced period take 
place. These oscillations (Sornette calls them log-periodic oscillations) are described 
by the second member C (tc – t)α cos[ω ln(tc – t)+φ] multiplied by the first considered 
member (whose value decreases with the lapse of time). Thus, the oscillations 
amplitude is steadily declining. 
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Of course, not only infinite, but also very high frequency of the financial 
market price fluctuations is really impossible. Achieving the oscillation frequency 
of high values means an increased risk of crisis. On average, in the examples treated 
by Sornette (2004), the crisis occurs 1.4 months before the critical point tc.  
At the moment of crisis, the growth of p(t) stops and there frequently begins 
its sharp decline (market crash). The second option marked by Sornette is a scenario 
when the bubble softly “blows off”, the price starts to decline more or less in reverse 
order with respect to the sequence in which it grew up (“anti-bubble”). This scenario 
is the least damaging to the economic and socio-political perspective and in order to 
direct the process to a smoother path various state regulatory mechanisms are used. 
In the practical implementation of the described methods of forecasting there 
rises the question of choosing the time interval for which the parameterization will 
be implemented. In Sornette’s monograph (2004) this issue is solved empirically, 
i.e. such an interval is chosen within which both the main growth trend and the 
oscillations with reduced periods described by equation (1) are clearly visible.  
We will use this method to calculate the date of a Juglar downturn in American 
economy and world economy as a whole. Below one might see the results of time 
series approximations, starting from 2009 (when the new bubble was formed) (see 
Fig. 8). (In calculations equation (1a) has been used). 
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Picture 8. Log-periodic oscillations in dynamics of DJIA 
between spring of 2009 and spring of 2016 
 
Note. The thin black curve corresponds to empirical data. The thick grey curve has 
been generated by the following equation with parameter values, defined through 
the least squares method: p(t) = 10890.6 – 854.392 ∙ (2017.80 – t)0.950 + 
85.600 ∙  (2017.80 – t)0.950 ∙  cos[14.928 ∙ ln(2017.80 – t) + 0.641]. Calculations by 
Alexey Fomin. 
 
Here the singularity point equals 2017.80 (= 10.19.2017). Thus, in accordance with 
these calculations, the nearest Juglar crisis in the American economy is likely to start 
in the fall of 2017. 
It is noteworthy, that calculations related to a longer period (starting from the 
end of the Great Depression in the early 1930-s) provide us with a different 
singularity point at approximately 2046 (see Fig. 9). This point helps forecast a 
potential ending of the upswing phase of the sixth K-wave.  
  
23 
 
 
Fig. 9. Log-periodic oscillations in dynamics of DJIA  
between spring of 1933 and spring of 2016 
 
Note. The thin black curve corresponds to empirical data. The thick grey curve has 
been generated by the following equation with parameter values, defined through 
the least squares method: p(t) = 31.214 +1.22 ∙ 107 / (2045.853 – t)2.047 + 4.74 ∙ 106 /  
(2045.853 – t)2.047  ∙  cos[24.202 ∙ ln(2045.853 – t) + 2.341]. Calculations by Alexey 
Fomin.  
 
 
Beginning of the expansion phase of the sixth K-wave. Forecast 
 
Japanese engineer and economist Hirooka pointed out, that current economic and 
technological paradigm consists of three trajectories (see Fig. 10), technology, 
development and diffusion [Hirooka, 2006]. Technology encompasses the key 
technologies, related to a certain discovery, which came about as a result of technical 
or scientific breakthrough. Development trajectory consists of new innovative 
products, developed with the use of key technologies. Development proves to be the 
most crucial trajectory, as knowledge is transmitted from R&D institutions to 
industry, and new ventures are established to produce and eventually commercialize 
the new product. Favorable conditions for ventures usually take place within the first 
10-15 years of the first half of the trajectory of development. 
 During this period, straight after the ending of the technology trajectory, 
comes about an intensive diffusion of an innovation into the market, which usually 
lasts for 25-30 years up to the market saturation. 
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Fig. 10. Electronics innovation paradigm  
Hirooka singled out and examined trajectory of development and showed it is 
represented with a logistic curve and lasts for approximately 30 years, beginning 
with a technological or scientific discovery. Hence, an innovation paradigm has a 
cascade structure, which consists of three logistic trajectories that have certain 
estimated distance between each other. This feature of an innovation paradigm 
enables more or less precise forecasting of diffusion of innovations into the market 
in accordance with previously defined technology trajectory (see Fig. 10), as is 
shown using the example with electronics [Hirooka, 2006]. The latter is 25-30 years 
ahead of the former, so it can be estimated before innovations enter the market. It is 
clear from Fig. 10, that technology of microelectronics began in 1948 when John 
Bardeen, Walter Brattain, and William Shockley introduced a transistor, a 
semiconductor device, and ended in 25 years, in 1973 when IBM introduced 
submicron lithography technique, which led to production of microchips, consisting 
of hundreds of millions of transistors. In 1973 Intel introduced the first 
microprocessor 4004, which contained 2300 transistors in silicon crystal. In 1974 
the upgraded microprocessor with operation memory of 256 bytes Intel-8008 was 
introduced. It could run more than 75 commands. That microprocessor was used to 
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develop the first personal computer in 1974. In two years, in 1976 Wozniak and Jobs 
introduced Apple, the first personal computer. Its mass use spread between 1977 and 
1978. Thus, it is clear that within 25-30 years after the introduction of a new basic 
technology, come about new innovative products, which form new markets. 
Using Hirooka’s innovation paradigm, we will try to forecast the beginning 
of the expansion phase of the sixth K-wave. We know precisely that the development 
trajectory of nanotechnologies began in 1985, when fullerene was introduced and 
synthesized. Fullerene is a molecule of carbon C60, consisting of 60 carbon atoms, 
which form a three-dimensional frame. It is the first artificial nanostructure. An 
atomic-force microscope was introduced in 1986. Its high resolution let see separate 
atoms and manipulate them. The microscope became the main instrument for 
creation of new nanostructures and their dimensions [Williams, Adams, 2007]. Later, 
the leading countries conducted further research in this sphere, which resulted in 
major inventions. Thus, as for the nanostructures, the following discoveries took 
place: in 1991 carbon nanotubes were introduced and later implemented in various 
spheres; in 2004 was discovered graphene, a flat carbon lattice one atom thick, which 
is now used in nanoelectronics. Due to their unique qualities, nanomaterials or 
“smart materials” are used in almost all the spheres of human activities, contributing 
to breakthroughs [Rudskoy, 2007]. 
Nanoinstruments were constantly being upgraded. Thus, came about scanning 
probe microscopes (SPM) with computer control, which allowed manipulating 
nanoparticles; optical tweezers for acquiring moving nanostructures in three-
dimensional space; nanomanipulators with piezo motors, allowing smooth and 
controlled movement in any direction. In other words, at present nanoinstruments 
have reached an extremely high level of perfection, which paves the way for 
introduction of new nanostructures with changed characteristics and new practices. 
Nanoinstruments for industrial use were also introduced to produce nanoparticles 
and nanomaterials according to existing demand [Williams, Adams, 2007]. 
Thus, we have ascertained, that nanotechnologies (nanomaterials and 
nanoinstruments) are developing successfully and in accordance with Hirooka’s 
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paradigm (see Fig. 10), which probably reached saturation point in 2016, about 30 
years after the SPM was introduced in 1986. Hence, according to Hirooka’s 
paradigm, the technology trajectory was finished in 2016, and in upcoming years 
one expect the start of a large-scale diffusion of innovative nanoproducts into 
markets, which will eventually lead to economic growth in developed nations, and 
later the global economic growth. In the work [Akaev, Pantin, Ayvasov, 2009], based 
on innovation and cyclic theory of economic development of Schumpeter and 
Kondratieff, it was shown, that current depression will be protracted and last up to 
2017-2018, when the expansion phase of the sixth K-wave will start. 
Hence, it is possible to state, that economies of the developed nations have 
experienced a certain revival since 2014-2015. Starting from 2018-2019, after the 
crisis of 2017 one could expect the start of the upswing phase of the sixth K-wave, 
defined by strong influence of the sixth techno-economic paradigm with its core of 
NBIC-convergence technologies. Therefore, governments of developed nations 
being the key actors in this sphere would rather concentrate all the resources and 
efforts to master NBIC-technologies, which form the sixth wave of innovation and 
the entire structure of the world economy. Period from 2017 to 2020-2024 is the 
most favorable time to master and spread new innovations on the basis of NBIC-
technologies [Akaev, Rudskoy, 2013]. 
NBIC-technologies develop with annual growth of 24%. According to the 
National Science Foundation, in 2015 the world market of nanoproducts and 
nanotechnologies totaled over 1 trillion dollars. Most was contributed by 
nanomaterials (31%), nanoelectronics (28%) and pharmaceuticals (17%). A new 
branch of the world economy with a high R&D intensity and more than 2 million 
highly qualified jobs was formed. We might expect an impressive start of new 
branches on the basis of NBIC-technologies, which will become the locomotive of 
the sixth K-wave. 
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